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The United States consumer bankruptcy system was severely tested and
found wanting during the financial crisis of 2008. Mortgage and consumer
debt dramatically outran household incomes in the first decade of the twenty-
first century, leading to a massive debt overhang.' Perhaps for the first time
in U.S. history, millions of homeowners found themselves with mortgage debt
greater than the sale value of their home, a situation that has come to be
known as being "underwater."2 A key function of any bankruptcy system is
to wring excess debt out of the economy and allow overburdened households
and firms to re-enter the market.3 Only a small fraction of underwater home-
owners and those facing foreclosure sought bankruptcy relief. Those who did
often failed to achieve their financial rehabilitation goals. The limitations
placed on the Bankruptcy Code in recent amendments seem to have hobbled
the law's ability to serve its basic function, at least insofar as underwater
homeowners are concerned.
A prior study found that homeowners facing foreclosure who filed bank-
ruptcy after 2007 were not significantly more likely to save their home.4
This study also found that obtaining a mortgage modification was a much
more effective strategy than bankruptcy.5 Some studies have similarly found
that the success rate for homeowner bankruptcies is disappointingly low,
while others have found better results for homeowners filing chapter 13
*Professor, CUNY Law School. The author thanks Elizabeth Fusco, Stacey Silliman, Jeffrey Maufrais
Kelly, Chloe Serinsky and Jonathan Cantarero for their invaluable research assistance, and Eric Frank and
an anonymous reviewer for their comments and suggestions. All errors and omissions are of course solely
the responsibility of the author.
'ATIF MIAN & AMIR Sum, HOUSE OF DEBT 4-6 (2014); IvAN VIDANGos, DELEVERAGING AND
RECENT TRENDS IN HOUSEHOLD DEBT (April 6, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/
notes/feds-notes/2015/deleveraging-and-recent-trends-in-household-debt-20150406.html.
'Robert Hockett, Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent Domain Solution for Underwater
Mortgage Debt, 19 CURRENT ISSUES IN EcON & FIN., no. 5, 2013, at 1.
3G. Ray Warner, Bankruptcy Reform and Economic Recovery, 25 J. Civ. RIGHTS & EcON. DEV. 181
(2010).
'Alan M. White & Carolina Reid, Saving Homes? Bankruptcy and Loan Modifications in the Foreclo-
sure Crisis, 65 FLA. L. REv. 1713 (2013).
sId. at 1732-33.
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bankruptcy.6 A recent nationwide study of 2007 chapter 13 filers found that
homeowners filing to prevent foreclosure were less likely to complete their
plans than other debtors, as were debtors who filed without an attorney, and
those with relatively high mortgage payments in relation to their income.?
Another recent study looking at chapter 13 filings in Chicago, Illinois
from 2006 to 2015 found that most chapter 13 filers (65%) were not home-
owners with mortgages and only 20% were homeowners with mortgages in
arrears." The authors noted that a higher percentage (47%) of debtors with
mortgage arrears terminated their cases before discharge than the debtors
whose mortgages were current when they filed (35% terminated). Many
homeowners terminated their chapter 13 cases within a few months after
they had fully cured their mortgage arrears. From this finding, the authors
inferred that the chapter 13 vehicle had been successful in preventing foreclo-
sure even though the debtors failed to obtain a chapter 13 discharge.
This raises the question of how we measure the success of a bankruptcy
filing. Pro se filers, whose cases are often dismissed shortly after filing, may
nevertheless derive significant benefit from postponing a foreclosure sale or
eviction by one month or two. Admittedly, the vast majority of homeowners
filing chapter 13 are hoping to save their homes. Professor Porter found in
her interviews with homeowners whose chapter 13 cases were dismissed or
converted that 88% identified "keep house" as a very important goal of their
filing.9 She notes that most of these debtors succeeded in the short run, in
the sense that they did not lose their home while their case was pending.'o
However, 70% of the debtors surveyed said they were unlikely to keep their
homes after exiting bankruptcy.' Her conclusion is that bankruptcy offers
debtors the illusion of debt relief without truly restoring their financial
health.12
'Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 TEx. L.
REv. 103, 144-47 (2011); Sarah W. Carroll & Wenli Li, The Homeownership Experience of Households in
Bankruptcy, 13 CITYSCAPE, no. 1, 2011, at 113, 114-16. But see Mark R. Lindblad, et. al., Bankruptcy
During Foreclosure: Home Preservation Through Chapters 7 and 13, 25 Hous. POLY DEBATE 41 (2015)
(finding that chapter 13 bankruptcy was effective in reducing the likelihood that homeowners would
experience a foreclosure sale); Will Dobbie & Jae Song, Debt Relief and Debtor Outcomes: Measuring the
Effects of Consumer Bankruptcy Protection, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1272 (2015) (finding that chapter 13
bankruptcy filers who were allowed to go forward had a significantly reduced likelihood of home foreclo-
sure when compared with chapter 13 filers whose cases were dismissed).
7
Sara S. Greene, Patina Patel & Katherine Porter, Cracking the Code: an Empirical Analysis of Con-
sumer Bankruptcy Outcomes, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1031 (2017).
'Edward R. Morrison & Antoine Uettwiller, Consumer Bankruptcy Pathologies (2016), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2845497.
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Regardless of how we define success in chapter 13, only a small minority
of homeowners facing foreclosure filed for chapter 13 protection during the
post-2008 foreclosure crisis. Mortgage lenders initiated roughly 2.5 million
residential foreclosures in 2010, the peak year of the crisis.13  During that
same year, debtors filed fewer than 500,000 chapter 13 cases.14 Fewer than
half of these filers had delinquent mortgages.'5 Thus, perhaps only one-in-ten
homeowners facing foreclosure petitioned for chapter 13 relief at the peak of
the foreclosure crisis. This article delves into homeowner bankruptcy case
files in search of some explanations for the apparent ineffectiveness of bank-
ruptcy as a long-term defense against foreclosure or as a tool for restructuring
home mortgage debt.
There are several reasons that chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in
particular should have been useful to homeowners during the foreclosure cri-
sis. First, the Code allows a homeowner with more than one mortgage to
remove and discharge junior mortgages when they are wholly underwater,
that is, when the home's market value is less than the amount owed on the
first mortgage, leaving no equity to pay junior liens.16 Junior mortgages
played a major role in the excessive home debt leading up to the foreclosure
crisis.17
Second, the automatic stay in bankruptcy and the chapter 13 plan process
provides the space and time for homeowners to navigate the complex mort-
gage modification process. The bankruptcy stay can give homeowners a
chance to complete a workout with their lender by preventing the lender
from completing a foreclosure sale, even if the debtor does not ultimately
receive a discharge.
Third, discharging substantial amounts of credit card, medical, and other
unsecured debts in bankruptcy should make it easier for moderate-income
homeowners to make their mortgage payments by freeing up cash flow.' 8
This benefit is particularly significant in states that allow wage garnishments
by unsecured creditors because the automatic stay will produce an immediate
increase in disposable income for any homeowner subject to a wage garnish-
"Susanna Kim, 2010 Had Record 2.9 Million Foreclosures, ABC NEWS (Jan 13, 2011), http://
abcnews.go.com/Business/20 1 -record-29-million-foreclosures/story?id= 12602271.
1
4U.S. COURTS, TABLE F-2 U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS-BUSINESS AND NONBUSINESS CASES COM-
MENCED, BY CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING DECEM-
BER 31, 2010, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/f-2/bankruptcy-filings/2010/12/31 (reporting
438,913 chapter 13 cases).
"See Morrison & Uettwiller, supra note 8; Greene, et. al., supra note 7.
' 6See Branigan v. Davis (In re Davis), 716 F.3d 331, 334-36 (4th Cir. 2013).
17Robbie Whelan, Second Mortgage Misery, WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2011); Vicki Been, Howell E. Jackson
& Mark A. Willis, Sticky Seconds: The Problem Second Liens Pose to the Resolution of Distressed Mort-
gages (2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2134937.
"sSee Greene, et. al., supra note 7 (noting that debtors with higher unsecured debt were more likely to
complete their chapter 13 plans).
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ment.19 This article explores whether these benefits actually make a differ-
ence in homeowner bankruptcies.
Two aspects of homeowner debt were historically unique to the 2008
subprime foreclosure crisis and the period leading up to it. One was the rapid
growth of second mortgage debt. As home prices rose faster than household
incomes, traditional lending standards deteriorated. Instead of extending a
loan for 80% of the home's value and requiring the debtor to pay the other
20% with cash, lenders began increasingly to offer the so-called "80/20" or
"piggyback" mortgage.20 Under this scheme, a home buyer would borrow
80% of the home value with a first mortgage, and then borrow the other 20%
with a second mortgage. In addition to purchase-money mortgages, borrow-
ers greatly increased the use of second mortgages and home equity lines of
credit (HELOCs) to finance other needs. Total junior mortgage debt grew
from $606 billion at the end of 2000 to more than $1 trillion by the end of
2009.21 Roughly 25% of all homeowners with mortgages had a second mort-
gage as well.22 To better understand the success or failure of bankruptcies
filed by homeowners during this period, this study focuses in part on the role
junior mortgages have played in chapter 13 bankruptcy plans.
The other historically unique aspect of the recent foreclosure crisis was
the widespread adoption of loan modification programs by mortgage ser-
vicers. Beginning with private voluntary efforts in 2007 and continuing with
the federal government's Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP),
an unprecedented number of mortgage loans had interest rates reduced, terms
extended, and sometimes even principal postponed or canceled, in an effort to
prevent foreclosures.2 3 Our prior study found that homeowners who ob-
tained modifications were much more successful in saving their homes than
those who filed bankruptcy but did not pursue a loan modification.
2 4 Since
these two strategies are not mutually exclusive, this study examines the ex-
tent to which homeowners who filed bankruptcy also pursued, or could have
pursued, a modification.
In order to better understand homeowner bankruptcies during the crisis,
1
9See Dobbie & Song, supra note 6.
20See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 109-110 (2011).
"1FED. RESERVE, STATISTICAL RELEASE Z.1, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES,
FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS FOURTH QUARTER 2009, table L. 218 (Mar. 11, 2010), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/20100311/zl.pdf; STATISTICAL RELEASE Z.1, FLOW OF FUNDS AC-
COUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS FOURTH QUARTER 2000, table L. 218
(Mar. 9, 2001), https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/20010309/l.pdf.
22 Been, et. al., supra note 17, at 4.
23A. Haughwout, et. al., Second Chances: Subprime Mortgage Modification and Redefault, 48 J. OF
MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 771 (2016); Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis:
Lessons from the Lackluster First Tear of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIz. L.
REV. 727 (2010).
"White & Reid, supra note 4.
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my research assistants and I compiled case data and reviewed bankruptcy
court records for homeowner bankruptcy filings in 2011 and 2012, when
foreclosures were still near their peak. A closer look at these homeowner
bankruptcies revealed that 1) chapter 13 filers were not taking full advantage
of available modification programs; 2) many did, however, take advantage of
the opportunity to strip off their underwater second mortgages; 3) they dis-
charged large amounts of unsecured debt, leaving them with sufficient income
to pay their mortgages; and 4) many of the bankruptcy cases that were dis-
missed shortly after filing were attributable to a significant number of pro se
bankruptcy filings. Setting aside these pro se filings, the success rate for the
remaining cases was much improved.
The first part of this article will review the tools available in the Bank-
ruptcy Code for homeowners in debt distress, with attention to the practical
cost and difficulty of employing those tools. The second part will describe
the dataset created and the methodology of the analysis. The third part re-
ports the results of the analysis and the article concludes with recommenda-
tions for changes to make bankruptcy more effective for homeowners facing
foreclosure.
I. THE BANKRUPTCY LAW TOOLS FOR HOMEOWNERS:
STRIPPING OFF JUNIOR MORTGAGE LIENS AND PLAN
PROVISIONS FOR MORTGAGE MODIFICATIONS
A. ALL CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL PERMIT STRIPPING OFF
UNDERWATER JUNIOR MORTGAGES IN CHAPTER 13
Arguably the most powerful tool that bankruptcy offers homeowners is
the ability to strip off unsecured junior mortgages. This is a tool that is only
available in chapter 13. Every court of appeals to consider the issue has held
that a chapter 13 debtor's plan may strip off a wholly underwater lien on a
debtor's principal residence.25 In other words, if the first mortgage balance
exceeds the value of the debtor's home, any second or third mortgage may be
voided and discharged, so that the debtor and her property are free of the
junior debt.
Several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code work together to give the
homeowner-debtor this power (and to limit it).26 Any debt secured by col-
2
5ranigan v. Davis (In re Davis), 716 F.3d 331, 334-36 (4th Cir. 2013); Zimmer v. PSB Lending Corp.
(In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1224-27 (9th Cir. 2002); Lane v. W Interstate Bancorp (In re Lane), 280
F.3d 663, 666-69 (6th Cir. 2002); Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty (In re Pond), 252 F.3d 122, 124-27 (2d
Cir. 2001); Tanner v. FirstPlus Fin., Inc. (In re Tanner), 217 F.3d 1357, 1358-60 (11th Cir. 2000); Bartee
v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass'n (In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 296 (5th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master
Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 615 (3d Cir. 2000).
"See In re Cusato, 485 BR. 824 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013) (explaining Code provisions permitting junior
mortgage strip off in chapter 13, but not in chapter 7).
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lateral, including a mortgage, is defined as a secured claim only to the extent
of the value of the creditor's interest in the collateral under §506(a) of the
Code.27 Although §506(d) says that a lien is void to the extent it is not a
secured claim, the Supreme Court has held that §506(d) does not permit a
bankruptcy debtor to reduce a mortgage debt to the value of the home in a
chapter 7 case.28
In contrast, a chapter 13 debtor (who must be an individual with regular
income and debts below certain levels)2 9 may propose a payment plan to
restructure her secured debts, with some important exceptions.
30 With most
secured debts, the chapter 13 debtor may reduce the amount of the secured
claim to the value of the collateral, discharging the remainder as unsecured
debt. The treatment of the secured portion of the debt is prescribed by the
Bankruptcy Code. It allows the debtor three options: (a) any treatment to
which the secured debt holder has agreed; (b) repayment of the secured debt,
with interest, retention of the lien, equal periodic payments, and, under cer-
tain circumstances, additional adequate protection payments; or (c) surrender
of the collateral.31
One of the important exceptions to this treatment of secured claims is set
forth in § 1322(b)(2). This provision prohibits modification of a home mort-
gage if the home is the debtor's principal residence and the lender's only
source of collateral. The Supreme Court held in the Nobleman case that
§1322(b) bars a chapter 13 debtor from bifurcating a first mortgage into a
secured and an unsecured claim, when the mortgage exceeds the value of the
home.32 Its ruling is premised on the fact that the first mortgage lender is the
holder of a "secured claim," at least in part, and its rights are protected from
bifurcation or other modification by this statute. Lower courts have ex-
tended this reasoning to the converse set of facts. When there is absolutely
no equity remaining after the first mortgage to support the junior mortgage,
then the junior mortgage holder does not hold a secured claim according to
§506(a). Without a secured claim, the anti-modification provision in
§ 1322(b) is inapplicable to the treatment of this claim. Thus, the debtor may
treat it as an unsecured claim. Every Circuit Court of Appeals has extrapo-
lated from Nobelman's ruling that a chapter 13 debtor may remove or strip
off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage lien.13
27All references to "§" or "section" in this article refer to Title 11, United States Code, unless ex-
pressly stated otherwise.
"Bank of Am. v. Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. 1995 (2015); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U. S. 410 (1992).
2911 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2012).
301d. §§ 1322(b)(2) and 1325(a)(9).
311d. § 1325(a)(5).
"Nobelman v. Am. Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
33
See supra note 28.
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The high court has yet to rule on the circuit courts' extension of its
Nobelman reasoning to allow the strip off of wholly unsecured junior mort-
gages in chapter 13. However, the Supreme Court has recently held in
Caulkett that this form of lien-stripping is not permitted in chapter 7. The
chapter 7 debtor in Caulkett relied on the language in § 506(d) to void or
strip off a wholly unsecured lien. This statute provides that, subject to two
exceptions, "[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that
is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void. . . ." Reasoning that this
provision's use of the same phrase "secured claim" should be given the same
meaning as it has in § 506(a), the debtor argued that § 506(d) permits void-
ing a lien unsupported by any collateral value. The Supreme Court dis-
agreed.3 5 Relying on its prior precedent in Dewsnup3 6 the Court held that
§ 506(d)'s reference to an allowed secured claim refers only to the fact that
the claim is allowed and that it is supported by a security interest in prop-
erty. In other words, § 506(d) does not take into account whether there is
any remaining value in the property to which the lien may attach. The con-
cept of a secured claim is defined differently, according to the Supreme Court,
in different provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and, indeed, in the different
subsections of the same statute.37
Thus, the definition of secured claim in § 506(d) is more pro-creditor
than its use in § 1322(b), which is more pro-debtor. This makes chapter 13
more attractive to debtors who have junior mortgages unsupported by collat-
eral value. Lien stripping is a powerful tool for debtors in chapter 13 that is
presently available in all U.S. bankruptcy courts. Of course, the Supreme
Court may still overrule all the lower courts on this point in a later case.38
Unless and until it does, chapter 13 debtors should continue to take advan-
tage of this opportunity, but they should be informed that there are varia-
tions among the bankruptcy courts as to how it may be employed, both
procedurally and substantively.
B. VARIATIONS AMONG THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS IN STRIPPING
OFF JUNIOR MORTGAGES
While all bankruptcy courts permit stripping off unsecured junior mort-
gages in principle, they vary considerably in the conditions they impose on
debtors who seek to use this tool. First, the court may require the debtor to
bring an adversary proceeding, essentially a lawsuit related to the bankruptcy
34Bank of Am., N.A. v. Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. 1995 (2015).
51d. at 1999.
36Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
37Id.
"For extended discussion of bankruptcy strip down of junior mortgages, see Lawrence Ponoroff, Hey,
the Sun is Hot and the Water's Fine: Why Not Strip Off That Lien?, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEv. J. 13 (2013).
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case, to obtain the order stripping off the junior mortgage. This requirement
adds considerably to the debtor's attorney fees and may be cost prohibitive
for some homeowners. Second, problems may arise if the homeowner in
bankruptcy is only one of two or more joint owners of the property. Third,
some bankruptcy courts will enter an order to strip off a junior mortgage
right away, while others will condition this relief on the debtor's completion
of the chapter 13 plan. If plan completion is required, any homeowner whose
case is dismissed prior to completion will lose the benefit of any lien stripping
order. These and other added conditions or restrictions will reduce the effec-
tiveness of the junior mortgage strip off tool.
1. Is strip off achieved by plan confirmation, motion, or adversary
proceeding?
There are three procedures a chapter 13 debtor might use to strip off a
junior mortgage lien.39 The easiest, and least costly in terms of attorney fees,
is simply to provide in the debtor's plan that specified junior mortgages are
not secured and, therefore, will be stripped off if the plan is confirmed. The
debtor would then rely on the binding effect of the court's order confirming
the plan to void the lien.40 If the court's confirmation order specifies that the
lien has been stripped off, then recording the confirmation order in the appro-
priate real property records will effectuate the release of the lien. The prepa-
ration and filing of a plan and seeking court confirmation of the plan are part
of the basic services that every chapter 13 debtor's attorney provides. Un-
fortunately, prior to the 2017 Rule amendments, most bankruptcy courts did
not permit junior mortgage strip off by the simple and inexpensive means of a
chapter 13 plan provision.41
When the plan confirmation process is not sufficient, two other potential
procedures are available: a contested proceeding begun by filing a motion and
an adversary proceeding initiated by filing a complaint.42 One of the districts
used for our empirical sample, the Southern District of Florida, permitted
strip off of underwater junior mortgages by filing a motion for valuation of
the home under § 506.43 A creditor who failed to object to the motion
"In re Ginther, 427 B. R. 450, 456 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) (collecting cases and analyzing relevant
bankruptcy rules).
4011 U.S.C. §1328 (2012); see In re Cusato, 485 B.R. 824 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013) (holding that a
valuation order by itself did not avoid a lien, but in combination with a confirmed plan would have
resulted in voiding an unsecured lien); In (e Sernaque, 311 B.R. 632 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2004) (noting that
local rules had been changed to require filing a separate motion to value the property, but that with proper
notice to the creditor, strip off via plan confirmation is permissible).
41See In re Ginther, 427 B. R. at 456; In re Perry, 337 B.R. 649 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (finding that
unsecured judgment lien could not be voided by boilerplate plan language).
42
1n re Sligh, 542 B.R. 723, 726 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2015) (explaining the two alternatives and noting
that practitioners assume an adversary complaint is needed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania).
4 3
BANKR. S.D. FLA. L.R. 3015-3(a)(1).
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would be bound by the debtor's valuation and by the plan that treats the
underwater junior mortgage as unsecured.
Within the Central District of California (which includes the Los Ange-
les area), the practice varie from one judge to another. Five judges require an
adversary proceeding. Fifteen allow strip offs through motion practice.
Three judges require an adversary proceeding in some but not all lien strip-
ping cases.44 The Central District of California bankruptcy court provides a
local form motion and order,45 as well as a local form for an adversary com-
plaint46 to strip off an unsecured junior mortgage. Apparently, the selection
of the proper form depends on the particular judge's preference. The local
form order also provides a variety of check boxes for the attorneys and the
judge, which include an option related to the timing of the lien stripping,
whether on completion of the plan or after the debtor's chapter 13
discharge.47
Another district included in our study sample, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, seems to require the filing of an adversary proceeding. This is a
more expensive and time-consuming process for the debtor.48 These differ-
ences in procedures, with their attendant differences in cost to the debtor,
may partly account for our finding that not all homeowners with underwater
second mortgages are taking advantage of this powerful bankruptcy tool.
2. Can a single debtor strip off an underwater mortgage if there is a
non-debtor joint owner?
If only one of two or more joint homeowners and mortgage borrowers
files bankruptcy, the other borrowers not filing bankruptcy remain liable on
the debt after their co-owner's bankruptcy discharge. The question arises
whether a bankruptcy involving only one of these borrowers may strip off a
lien for the benefit of all the non-debtor borrowers. One court has answered
this question in the negative, ruling that lien stripping is only available if all
the borrowers and homeowners file for bankruptcy.49 This distinction might
also account for some underutilization of the junior mortgage strip off.
"U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, JUDICIAL PRACTICES SURVEY at
83 (rev. April 2013), http://www.cacb.uscourts.gov/sites/cacb/files/documents/
JudicialPracticesSurvey.pdf.
4
1BANKR. C.D. CAL. LOCAL FORM 4003-2.4, DEBTOR'S MOTION To AVOID JUNIOR LIEN ON PRINCI-
PAL RESIDENCE, http://www.cacb.uscourts.gov/forms/local bankruptcy-rulesforms.
4 6
BANKR. C.D. CAL. LOCAL FORM 4003-2.5, DEBTORS COMPLAINT TO AVOID JUNIOR LIEN ON
PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE, http://www.cacb.uscourts.gov/forms/local bankruptcy-rulesforms.
4 7
BANKR. C.D. CAL. LOCAL FORM 4003-2.4, ORDER GRANTING/DENYING MOTION To AVOID JUN
IOR LIEN ON PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE, http://www.cacb.uscourts.gov/forms/local-bankruptcy-rules forms.
48In re Sligh, 542 B.R. 723, 726 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2015); In re Verratti, 517 BR. 564 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 2015); In re Hamilton, 2013 WL 1819546 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. April 22, 2013).
49
In re Fernandez, 2013 WL 5976249, 1 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2013); In re Alvarez, 2012 WL
1425097(Bankr. S.D. Fla. April 24, 2012).
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3. Will the bankruptcy court order voiding the underwater mortgage
take effect immediately, or only after completion of a chapter 13
plan or the entry of final discharge?
An obstacle to the debtor's fresh start in any chapter 13 bankruptcy is
that the discharge of debts depends on successful completion of the plan pay-
ments. Most chapter 13 cases are dismissed before plan completion and dis-
charge.50 Ordinarily, orders affecting property interests of creditors are
automatically undone if a case is dismissed.5' Thus, a chapter 13 plan is more
akin to an accord and satisfaction than to an immediate modification of debt
contracts.
Stripping off an unsecured junior mortgage usually must be accomplished
before a chapter 13 plan can be confirmed, if the homeowner proposes to
retain the home and not repay the junior mortgage debt. Otherwise, the
treatment of the junior mortgage holder's claim would not conform to any of
the three options available to the debtor under §1325 to deal with secured
debts. The homeowner will, therefore, seek a court order early in the chapter
13 case stripping off unsecured junior mortgage liens. The debtor will nor-
mally want an order not only classifying the junior mortgage as unsecured for
plan purposes, but also voiding the lien.
Creditors with underwater mortgages may object to an order directing
them to void their mortgage (or directing the county recorder to void the
mortgage) during the pendency of the bankruptcy case. After all, the bank-
ruptcy case may be dismissed, if the debtor fails to make chapter 13 plan
payments or for other reasons. Holders of these junior mortgages argue that
the lien should not be voided until the debtor successfully completes plan
payments and receives a discharge.
Lien strip off has been conditioned on successful plan completion by the
bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Ohio.52 The form order used
in the Southern District of Florida provides:
Lender's mortgage recorded at [recording information] shall
be deemed void and shall be extinguished automatically,
without further order of the Court, upon entry of the
Debtor(s) discharge in this chapter 13 case. If this case is
converted to a case under any other chapter or if the chapter
13 case is dismissed, Lender's mortgage will no longer be
soSee supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
"11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(1)(C) (2012).
S
2In re DeLong, No. 07-30329, 2007 WL 1121245 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio April 11, 2007).
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considered void and shall be restored as a lien on the Real
Property.5
Similarly, the Central District of California's form order granting a mo-
tion to "avoid" a junior mortgage lien in chapter 13 provides that the lien
avoidance is effective either on completion of the plan payments or when the
discharge is entered.54
The 2017 amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules resolved these issue to a
large extent. Rule 3012 now provides that a chapter 13 debtor may request
to determine the amount of a secured claim in one of three ways: by motion,
by objection to claim, or in the plan itself on condition that the plan is served
on affected creditors.55 Rule 5009 permits a debtor to file a motion request-
ing an order that a secured claim has been satisfied and the associated lien has
been released.56
Some bankruptcy judges are willing to enter orders on motion immedi-
ately voiding unsecured junior mortgages, leaving it to the creditor to take
action to revive the lien if the bankruptcy is dismissed7 In a district where
the court requires plan completion or entry of discharge before voiding the
junior mortgage, the benefit to the homeowner is significantly delayed.
These differences in local practice, and the resulting legal fees, may account
for some of the geographic variation in the use of lien strip offs by homeown-
ers in chapter 13.
4. What is the date of valuation for a junior mortgage strip off?
In a contested hearing to determine whether the debtor may strip off a
junior mortgage, the court will usually have to determine the home's value.
The court must make this valuation as of a particular date, usually either the
petition date or as of the date of the contested hearing. In a rapidly rising or
falling real estate market, the home's value could be significantly different
from one date to the other. The bankruptcy court in In re Aubain5s held
that the date of valuation should be flexible, and take into consideration the
sIn re Zelaya, No. 11-18972-RAM (Bankr. S.D. Fla. May 18, 2011) (Order Granting Motion To
Value And Determine Secured Status Of Lien On Real Property Held By Chase Manhattan Mortgage).
54See supra note 47.
ssFED. R. BANKR. P. 3012(b).
"FED. R. BANKR. P. 5009(d); see also ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON BANKRUPTcy RULES, ADDENDUM
WITH CHAPTER 13-RELATED MATERIALS (October 1-2, 2015), www.uscourts.gov/file/18428/download.
s"See CHIEF JUDGE CECELIA MORRIS, FORM ORDER VOIDING JUNIOR MORTGAGE LIEN, http://
www.nysb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/FormOrderPond.doc. The Committee Notes to the 2017
Rule 5009 amendments also clear up this question for future cases: "Although requests for [lien voiding]
orders are likely to be made at the time the case is being closed, the rule does not prohibit a request at
another time if the lien has been released and any other requirements for entry of the order have been
met." ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON BANKRUPTcy RULES, ADDENDUM WITH CHAPTER 13-RELATED
MATERIALS 114 (October 1-2, 2015), www.uscourts.gov/file/18428/download.
"296 BR. 624 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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equities of the case, including the reasons that home value may have increased
or decreased since the petition date.
These are but a few of a myriad of issues that plague homeowners who
seek to use the strip off tool in chapter 13. Whatever the merits of these
various issues, the point is that the transaction cost for a homeowner to re-
lieve herself of apparently unsecured junior mortgages may be high because
mortgage holders can raise a variety of legal issues that require expensive
litigation. Thus, the procedural requirements and substantive legal decisions
of individual judges may make a significant difference in the usefulness of the
strip off tool.
C. CHAPTER 13 PLAN CONFIRMATION AND VOLUNTARY
MORTGAGE MODIFICATIONS
As previously discussed,59 when the lien is supported by some collateral
value, whether fully secured or undersecured, § 1322(b)(2) places severe re-
strictions on a debtor's ability to modify a mortgage on the debtor's primary
residence. Unless the mortgage is on a second home, the lien is not a consen-
sual security interest, or the loan is secured by additional collateral, the home-
owner is not permitted to modify and restructure the mortgage, such as by
reducing the interest rate or reducing the principal to the value of the prop-
erty.60 There are, however, two permitted modifications.
Curing defaults under the mortgage over the life of the plan is permit-
ted.61 The other permitted modification is the ability to extend the term of
the loan but this modification may only be used when the final mortgage
payment is contractually due in less than five years. In other words, if the
mortgage loan will mature during the plan, then the homeowner may extend
the loan's term to the full five-year life of the plan. If the loan matures in
more than five years, the homeowner may not extend the term of the loan
but, in lieu of paying the entire mortgage balance in the five-year maximum
plan duration, the homeowner may instead maintain current monthly pay-
ments while also curing any mortgage arrears over the five-year term of the
plan.
62
Outside of bankruptcy, homeowners had few options until the 2007
mortgage foreclosure crisis led to widespread adoption of voluntary mortgage
loan modification programs.63 The federal government's HAMP program, as
59See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
60l1 U.S.C. §1322(b)(2) (2012).
61Id. § 1322(b)(3), (b)(5).
621d. §1322(b)(5). The debtor may also cure a default and maintain current payments on a mortgage
that matures in less than five years under §1322(b)(3).
6 3Alan M. White, Deleveraging the American Homeowner: The Failure of 2008 Voluntary Mortgage
Contract Modifications, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1107 (2009).
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well as other programs, encouraged mortgage servicers to offer interest rate
and principal debt reductions, as well as payment deferrals, as an alternative
to massive foreclosures of homes at depressed prices.64 The HAMP loan
modification template called for reducing the homeowner's mortgage payment
to 31% of monthly income.65 The reduction in interest rate and deferral of
principal repayment under a HAMP modification would almost invariably
result in lower payments than the debtor could hope to achieve through a
chapter 13 plan alone. The Treasury Department has reported that the me-
dian monthly mortgage payment after permanent HAMP modifications was
reduced from $1,361 to $807, and the median monthly borrower income was
$3,985.66 The HAMP program requires the homeowner to make three con-
secutive timely payments under a temporary trial modification plan, as well
as complying with other conditions, before approval of a permanent
modification.
Unfortunately, the processing of delinquent homeowner requests for
HAMP and other voluntary mortgage modifications has been fraught with
delays and confusion, including complaints that foreclosures proceeded while
modification requests were left languishing.67 Homeowners have obtained
temporary modifications only to wait far beyond the three-month trial period
to receive permanent modifications.68 Some of these homeowners filed for
chapter 13 relief, partly to gain time while awaiting final approval. Faced
with pending-but-unapproved modification requests, bankruptcy courts have
struggled with how to proceed with the chapter 13 process.69
Until the mortgage servicer approves a permanent voluntary mortgage
modification, a chapter 13 debtor's plan must propose one of the three statu-
tory options for treatment of the mortgage debt.70 If a homeowner with the
median HAMP modification is temporarily paying $807 instead of the con-
tractually required $1,361 payment, the debtor faces a dilemma. Should she
propose a plan with the intended modification payment of $807, which the
6
4
See Braucher, supra note 23.65 d. at 729.
66
Making Home Affordable Program, Program Performance Report through the Second Quarter of
2015, at 7 (2015), https://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/Documents/
2Q15%2OQuarterly%20MHA%2oReport%2oFinal.pdf.
67See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, 673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing dismissal of breach of
contract class action for failure to convert temporary HAMP modification plans to permanent ones).6
8Karen Weise, Loan Mod Profiles: Delayed then Denied, Often Mistakenly, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 18,
2010), https://www.propublica.org/article/loan-mod-profiles-delayed-then-denied.
' 9See, e.g., In re Nardini, 2015 WL 9438292 (Bankr. D. Vt. Dec. 23, 2015) (permitting debtor's plan to
temporarily reduce mortgage payments during mediation with mortgage company concerning possible loan
modification); In re Yarbrough, 490 BR. 328 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2013) (ordering mortgage company to
respond promptly to HAMP modification request to assist debtor in completing a previously confirmed
plan).
70In re Morales, 506 B.R. 213 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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court is unlikely to confirm without the lender's consent?
71 Or should the
plan reflect the mortgage's required payment of $1,361, which she may be
unable to afford? Or might a court approve a hybrid solution of the reduced
$807 payments under a temporary modification prior to plan confirmation,
but the full $1,361 payments after the plan is confirmed until the creditor
agrees to make the modification permanent?
The court could postpone the confirmation hearing until the modification
is either approved or denied, but that approach may require repeated post-
ponements. The court could require the debtor to propose a conventional
plan and then seek postconfirmation modification under §1327 after the
mortgage modification is approved, but that approach will increase the
debtor's attorney fees and require some period of reverting to the higher,
unmodified monthly payments. One bankruptcy court mitigated the harsh-
ness of requiring a homeowner to continue prior mortgage payments until the
mortgage servicer approved a modification by ordering the servicer to make a
prompt decision on the modification application, presumably so that the ser-
vicer could modify the payment before plan confirmation.
72
D. MODELING THE HOMEOWNER's DECISION To FILE BANKRUPTCY
The ability to strip off second mortgages, combine chapter 13 plan strate-
gies with loan modification programs like HAMP, and to stay foreclosures
offered by a bankruptcy filing should have given distressed homeowners a
powerful set of tools to save their homes. Of course, there are both legal
limitations and practical difficulties that arise when employing these tools,
making them more costly and less effective. Nevertheless, we can construct a
simple theoretical model of how a homeowner facing foreclosure in 2011
might have analyzed the decision of whether to seek chapter 13 protection.
A homeowner with significant underwater second mortgage debt, an un-
manageably large amount of unsecured debt, and an affordable first mortgage
payment would be a best-case scenario for electing chapter 13 relief. On the
other hand, a homeowner with few or no other debts, with a mortgage pay-
ment ratio high enough to benefit from HAMP and other modification pro-
grams outside of bankruptcy, and with no second mortgage, would gain little
by filing. A homeowner whose current monthly mortgage payment is unaf-
fordable might also file, but would be less likely to succeed in completing a
">See In re Terry, 2013 WL 121240 (Bankr. D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2013) (finding it was not bad faith to
propose a plan based on the prospect of a pending HAMP modification request); UNITED STATES BANK-
RUPTCY COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, GUIDELINES REGARDING RESIDENTIAL LOAN
MODIFICATIONS ON RELIEF FROM STAY MOTIONS AND IN CHAPTER 11 AND CHAPTER 13 PLANS (Dec.
1, 2010), http://www.canb.uscourts.gov/procedure/guidelines-re-residential-loan-modifications-relief-stay-
motions-and-chapter- 11-and (permitting confirmation of plans contemplating mortgage modification if the
plan provides for reverting to original terms if modification is not approved).
72I re Morales, 506 B.R. at 221.
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chapter 13 plan without also negotiating a mortgage modification agreement
with the creditor. Homeowners with unaffordable mortgage payments might
seek bankruptcy protection either to benefit from the automatic stay while
negotiating a modification, or to discharge unsecured debts while selling or
surrendering their home. To gain a better understanding of how debtors ac-
tually used chapter 13 during the foreclosure crisis, we took an in-depth look
at a sample of cases filed during this period to see whether actual filings fit
our hypothetical model.
II. DATA SAMPLE
To evaluate and better understand the effectiveness of chapter 13 in help-
ing homeowners, we collected data from electronic bankruptcy court records,
available to the public through PACER.73 Although the Administrative Of-
fice of the United States Courts reports some statistics compiled from
PACER data,7 4 the variables of interest to us were not available from these
reports. Therefore, we had to dig deeper into the electronic case files. We
selected seven districts based on their high foreclosure rates and included
states with both judicial and non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. For each
district in the sample, we coded data for the first twenty-five eligible cases in
each quarter, beginning with the second quarter of 2011 through the first
quarter of 2012. We also coded about twenty cases each from two additional
districts. Our resulting sample was comprised of 740 cases.
Cases were eligible for inclusion if the debtor was a homeowner, had at
least one mortgage, and had filed a chapter 13 plan. Variables included the
value of the home and other assets, the amount of the first mortgage, junior
mortgage, and other secured and unsecured debt, the debtor's income and
expenses, and the proposed plan treatment of any mortgage debts. During
early 2015, we also reviewed these cases to code their status at that point,
roughly three years after filing, noting whether the debtors had received a
discharge and whether the case was still active or dismissed. We pulled this
information from the debtor's schedules, statement of financial affairs, first
filed plan, and the disclosure of attorney's fees. The coding of plan provisions
required some exercise in judgment by the research assistants. The author
also reviewed a subset of plans in the sample.
A key selection bias resulting from this method was the exclusion of two
large groups of homeowner bankruptcies: all chapter 7 bankruptcy cases and




For example, tables are available reporting numbers of cases filed by chapter and by district for
various periods, but without details from debtors' schedules. See http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-re-
ports/caseload-statistics-data-tables (last visited March 6, 2018)
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filings because they do not involve a realistic attempt to save a home through
a repayment plan. In a chapter 7 filing, the debtor does not propose a plan.
The trustee sells the debtor's non-exempt assets, the proceeds are distributed
according to the Bankruptcy Code's priorities, and any debts remaining un-
paid are discharged, with some exceptions. If the debtor's home value is fully
exempt, the trustee will not sell it, but the mortgage lien will remain enforce-
able after the case is closed. If the debtor-homeowner emains in default of
the mortgage loan, foreclosure may then proceed. Thus, chapter 7 filings are
rarely used to address a mortgage foreclosure.
The chapter 13 cases in which the debtor did not file a plan were filed
primarily by pro se debtors. These case were frequently dismissed within
two or three months of filing. For example, in the Southern District of Flor-
ida for the quarter beginning January 1, 2012, we had to skip over twenty-
seven other chapter 13 filings in which a plan was never filed before identify-
ing twenty-five eligible cases. Of those "no-plan" cases, five had been filed by
an attorney and the other twenty-two were filed by pro se debtors. We
could not determine whether the no-plan cases were filed by a homeowner
because the debtor did not file schedules either. These so-called "quick peti-
tion" cases were likely filed to obtain the automatic stay under §362(a) to
delay an imminent collection event, such as a foreclosure sale, eviction, or
garnishment.
When the debtor fails to file the schedules, statement of financial affairs,
and plan within fourteen days of the petition filing date, as required by the
federal bankruptcy rules,75 the case will be dismissed.76 These quickly dis-
missed cases distort the result of studies that consider all homeowner bank-
ruptcies because they account for a large number of unsuccessful cases, i.e.
cases in which a reorganization plan is not completed. Our exclusion of the
no-plan cases was driven in part by the lack of data these cases provide, but
also by the desire to look at the debtor-homeowners' reorganization plans and
the outcomes of those plans in cases where the debtor was able to get past
the starting line and actually make an attempt to use the tools that the Bank-
ruptcy Code offers.
III. FINDINGS
A. ARE HOMEOWNERS STRIPPING OFF SECOND MORTGAGES IN
CHAPTER 13?
Since chapter 13 allows homeowners to eliminate and discharge underwa-
ter second mortgages, one would expect to see a significant number of home-
owner chapter 13 plans make use of this powerful tool. In our sample, about
7
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007.
7611 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(1)(B), 1307(c) (2012).
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45% of homeowners had a second mortgage. Of those with junior mortgages,
about 73% were wholly unsecured, meaning the first mortgage balance ex-
ceeded the listed home value. This equates to about one in three homeowner
bankruptcies that involved an underwater junior mortgage. This is signifi-
cantly higher than the estimated 25% in other studies.77
Thus, homeowners in distress may be more likely to turn to the bank-
ruptcy system if they have a second mortgage. It also indicates that home-
owners with second mortgages may be more likely to default on their
mortgages and, thus, be candidates for a bankruptcy filing. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, however, of these cases with an underwater junior mortgage, only
65% of the 242 plans we reviewed proposed to strip off the junior mortgage.
Thus, a significant share of homeowners who might have freed themselves of
these unsecured mortgages did not propose to do so.
There was considerable variation among the studied districts. In Arizona
and California, 80% or more of the plans involving underwater junior mort-
gages proposed to strip off these liens. In Florida and Ohio, with far fewer
homeowners with junior mortgages, less than one in three plans proposed a
strip off. (See Table 1).
77See Greene, et al., supra note 7.
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Table 1: Chapter 13 Plan Treatment of Underwater Second Mortgages
12i st rict I Second mortg e included in plan? Cases of uinderwater second mort 'gg-e =1 N=2421
Missing Stripdown Cure Not Current Surrender Total
included
[AZ Count 2 43 0 3 4 2 54
% within District 3.7% 79.6% 0.0% 5.6% 7.4% 3.7% 100.0%
CDCA Count 0 46 3 4 0 2 55
% within District 0.0% 83.6% 5.5% 7.3% 0.0% 3.6% 100.0%
EDNY Count 0 27 2 2 0 33
% within District 0.0% 81.8% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 0.0% 100.0%
EDPA Count 0 13 3 2 1 0 19
% within District 0.0% 68.4% 15.8% 10.5% 5.3% 0.0% 100.0%
MDGA Count 0 1 4 1 0 0 6
% within District 0.0% 16.7% 66.7% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
NDCA Count 0 3 0 1 0 0 4
% within District 0.0% 75.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
NDGA w nout i 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
% within District 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
DLOH Count 2 9 6 1 4 1 6 25
% within District 8.0% 36.0% 24.0% 4 .0% 4.0% 24.0% 100.0%
SDFL Count 0 15 11 14 2 3 45
% within District 0.01% 33.3% 24.4% 31.1% 4.4% 6.7% 100.0%
Total Count 4 158 29 28 10 13 242
% within District 1.7% 65.3% 12.0% 11.6% 4.1% 5.4% 100.0%
While the ability to strip off second mortgages is utilized in many cases, many
more cases warrant expanded use of this tool.
B. Do HOMEOWNERS IN CHAPTER 13 HAVE LARGE UNSECURED
DEBTS?
Another possible driving force behind a bankruptcy filing is the discharge
of unsecured debt. This is a particularly important factor in states that per-
mit creditors to garnish a debtor's wages. The median unsecured debt in the
sample of homeowners studied was $32,000 and the mean was $78,000. (See
Table 2). A small number of debtors reported unusually large amounts of
unsecured debts, up to $1.2 million.78 The median income was $4,020 and the
median mortgage payment was $1,069. These numbers are somewhat higher
than those reported for all chapter 13 filings by the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts.79 This is not surprising, given that this study
7
1Section 109(e) renders a debtor ineligible for chapter 13 relief if unsecured debts exceed $394,725,
but only liquidated and noncontingent debts are counted toward this debt ceiling. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)
(2012).
7 9
The median current monthly income from Schedule I for all chapter 13 filers for the 12 months
ended December 31, 2011 was $3,780. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTs, BAPCPA TABLE
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includes only debtors who own homes.
The median unsecured debt in the cases we studied amounted to about
60% of annual income. Carrying this high percentage of unsecured debt un-
doubtedly hampers the bankrupt homeowners' ability to pay the mortgage.
For example, if the median unsecured debt bore interest at typical credit card
interest rates in 2011 of 13%, then the minimum monthly payment on this
debt would be about $660, based on the interest plus 1% of principal repay-
ment requirement.s0 This extra $660 in monthly payments would bring total
monthly debt service to 43% of the median debtor's income. A debtor with
debts at higher interest rates would face even greater payment stress, as
would those debtors whose unsecured debt was above the median in this
sample. Filing bankruptcy to discharge large unsecured debts helps home-
owner debtors to save their homes, by freeing up much needed cash flow to
pay the mortgage debt.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Homeowner Chapter 13 Debtor Sample
N Minimum Maximum Mean Median
Monthly Income 743 0 29,972 4,933 4,020
Total Mdonthly Ex enses 743 215 28,532 4,106 3,342
Home Value 733 1 924,000 194,801 128,106
1 st Mortgage Balance 732 7,200 893,492 219,572 147,4541
2nd Mortgage Balance 337 0 375,590 63,928 50,000
lst Mortgage Monthly 706 0 4,559 1,496 1,069
Payment
Total Attorney's Fees 714 0 8,000 3,376 3,000
Toa :neured Debt 731 0 12155,546 77,645 3 2,047
Plan payments 710 20 6,140 920 500
C. ARE HOMEOWNERS IN CHAPTER 13 ALSO PURSUING LOAN
MODIFICATIONS FOR WHICH THEY ARE ELIGIBLE?
We found very little evidence in the homeowners' chapter 13 plans we
studied that these debtors had taken or intended to take advantage of availa-
ble nonbankruptcy mortgage workouts and loan modifications. Mortgage
modifications under the HAMP program were available for homeowners
2D, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS--INCOME AND EXPENSES REPORTED BY INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS IN
CHAPTER 13 CASES WITH PREDOMINANTLY NONBUSINEss DEBTS COMMENCED DURING THE 12
MONTH PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2011, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/bapcpa-2d/
bankruptcy-abuse-prevention-and-consumer-protection-act-bapcpa/2011/12/3 1.
soFED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS, DATA RELEASE G.19, https://www.federalreserve.gov/re-
leases/gl9/20171207/.
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whose monthly mortgage payment exceeded 31% of monthly income.
8 '
Many mortgage servicers also offered other programs to restructure mort-
gages voluntarily to prevent foreclosure, in cases where the restructuring
would mitigate investor losses on the loan. About 50% of the homeowners
in the sample had mortgage-payment-to-income ratios exceeding 31% and
about 30% exceeded 38%. A very small share of the plans filed by these
debtors made explicit reference to seeking or obtaining a HAMP modifica-
tion. We recorded only 3% of all chapter 13 plans that intended to rely on
HAMP or other modification programs to deal with the first mortgage. A
slightly larger share (5%) of homeowners with high mortgage payment ratios
(38% or more) proposed to seek a modification in their plans. Certainly,
there may have been cases in which attorneys filed generic chapter 13 plans
to cure mortgage arrears, without disclosing they were also pursuing a
HAMP modification independent of the chapter 13 plan, but we found little
evidence in the plans themselves that delinquent homeowners sought to com-
bine the tools of the Code with the aid available through voluntary loan
modification programs.
There are several possible explanations for this disconnect. Perhaps
homeowners pursue modifications before filing and only when they fail to
obtain a modification do they opt to pay a bankruptcy attorney (whose fees
averaged $3,376 in our sample) to try chapter 13 as a last resort. It may also
be true that mortgage servicers are reluctant to consider modification re-
quests from debtors in bankruptcy, even though HAMP guidelines explicitly
state that bankruptcy should not be a bar to a HAMP modification.
82 It may
be because debtors' attorneys find it difficult to obtain timely decisions on
nonbankruptcy mortgage modifications during the short time between filing a
chapter 13 case and plan confirmation. They may file a chapter 13 plan that
assumes the mortgage cannot be modified, with the intention of amending the
plan or dismissing the case if a nonbankruptcy modification is later approved.
D. WHAT WERE THE OUTCOMES OF HOMEOWNER CHAPTER 13
CASES AFTER THREE YEARS?
By focusing only on homeowner debtors who filed schedules and a plan,
and disregarding the substantial number of cases dismissed at the outset, we
find respectable but not spectacular rates of success for homeowner bank-
ruptcies. We checked the case dockets in the first quarter of 2015, thirty-six
to forty-five months after the cases had been filed, to code case outcomes.
About one-half (47%) of the cases in the sample had been dismissed, three or
8 Braucher, supra note 23.
8 2
MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM, HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS OF NON-GSE MORTGAGES,
73 (Version 5.1 May 26, 2016), https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp-servicer/
mhahandbook_51.pdf.
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more years into their five-year plans. A modest number, about 9%, had re-
ceived a discharge and about 43% remained active.
Prior studies have found 50% to 70% of homeowner bankruptcies were
terminated within less than one year.83 Early dismissals of cases where the
homeowner does not even file schedules or a plan account for a significant
portion of the early failure rates reported elsewhere. Because this study sam-
ple excluded the no-plan chapter 13 cases, our data reveals an improved pic-
ture of homeowner chapter 13 outcomes. It is probable that a large majority
of chapter 13 cases still active after three years will be successfully com-
pleted. A rate of more than 50% case survival or discharge after three years
is substantially better than what is observed in studies that do not filter out
the early dismissals.
Thus, a more nuanced picture emerges. Many homeowners, especially
those filing pro se, are unable or unwilling to follow through with a reorgani-
zation plan that can be confirmed, and so their cases are dismissed quickly.
Any foreclosure delay the debtors achieve in these cases is likely quite brief.
Debtors who file unrealistic plans do not fare much better. For example,
about 8% of the plans in the sample called for monthly debt payments that
exceeded the debtor's total monthly income. If we limited the sample by
excluding plans with wholly unrealistic monthly payments (for example, ex-
ceeding 70% of income), the case survival rate would be even higher. A fair
question is why are these unfeasible plans confirmed? The Bankruptcy Code
requires the court to make a finding at confirmation that the plan is feasible,84
but if no one objects to feasibility at confirmation, most courts are unlikely to
deny confirmation on this basis. The bankruptcy system filters out the unfea-
sible plans only by dismissing the cases when debtors are unable to make
payments or to obtain confirmation.
As previous studies have shown, unaffordable mortgage payments were
also predictive of case dismissal.85 Homeowners with a mortgage payment
exceeding 50% of their reported income had their chapter 13 dismissed in
67% of cases. By way of contrast, the dismissal rate for homeowners whose
mortgage payment was less than 30% of reported income was only 45%.
Any study of chapter 13 case outcomes would do well to isolate the no-plan
cases and the unrealistic plans in their findings. The remaining cases would
provide a better indication of the true success rate of chapter 13 saving
homes.
"White & Reid, supra note 4, at 1727.
84l U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2012).
8 Greene, et. al., supra note 7.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Four findings emerge from this sampling of homeowner chapter 13 cases.
The first is that the failure rate of homeowner bankruptcies results in signifi-
cant part from the filing of thousands of pro se petitions by debtors who
never file chapter 13 plans and, thus, have their cases promptly dismissed.
The problem of pro se consumer bankruptcy filings has been extensively dis-
cussed elsewhere and has resulted in several Code amendments to regulate
non-attorney petition preparers and to address other related problems.
86
Whether most or any of these homeowners could have succeeded with a
lawyer or some other assistance is a question for further study. Several possi-
ble remedies suggest themselves. First, the credit counselors that, debtors
must consult before being permitted to file bankruptcy might use expert sys-
tems software to quickly calculate possible chapter 13 plans and the required
payments, and counsel pro se debtors on the risks of filing chapter 13 without
an attorney. Counselors or even the courts might provide debtors with ac-
cess to forms software that would allow pro se filers to complete the required
schedules and repayment plan before they file. In that way, potential filers
could more quickly evaluate chapter 13 plan feasibility. Second, at the dis-
missal hearing stage, the chapter 13 trustee might also provide computer-
assisted tools for debtors to determine whether they can or cannot go for-
ward with a feasible repayment plan. This might require expansion of the
chapter 13 trustee's statutory role.
The second finding is that many homeowners filing chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy petitions at least attempted to strip off second mortgage debt, as well
as to discharge large amounts of unsecured debt. In other words, chapter 13
filers seem to fit the theoretical model of which homeowners should seek
bankruptcy relief. However, costs, legal issues, and procedural obstacles may
make the strip off remedy less useful than it otherwise might be. With the
average debtor agreeing to pay more than $3,000 in attorney's fees, the addi-
tional costs of litigation needed to get mortgage debt relief may be prohibitive
in some cases.87 The amended rules that now simplify the motion practice to
strip off junior mortgages, and perhaps some standardization of attorney fees
for these services, should increase the use of this important tool.
"See Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L. J. 191 (2005); A.
Jay Cristol, The Nonlawyer Provider of Bankruptcy Legal Services: Angel or Vulture, 2 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 353 (1994).
8
7
See supra Table 2. It should be noted that in dismissed cases debtors have typically not paid the
entire amount of their agreed attorney's fees. One study found that chapter 13 debtors completing their
plans paid an average fee of $2,861 (in 2005 dollars), compared with an average $1,491 paid by debtors in
dismissed chapter 13 cases. Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study: Final Report, 20 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17 (2012).
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The third finding is that few, if any, chapter 13 plans explicitly reference
mortgage modification programs available outside of bankruptcy. While this
could be solely an artifact of the limitations of the plan forms used by law-
yers, it still suggests that much work remains to be done to better coordinate
homeowner chapter 13 plans with non-bankruptcy foreclosure alternatives.
The bankruptcy system could be improved to assist debtors in exploring all
realistic options. At the first meeting of creditors, chapter 13 trustees could
discuss with debtors what modification options they have pursued or that
might be available to them. More bankruptcy courts could follow the lead of
those districts that have implemented successful mediation programs to en-
courage workouts between mortgage servicers and chapter 13 debtors.88 Al-
though it must hold an initial confirmation hearing early in the case,89 the
bankruptcy court could delay further confirmation proceedings to permit
debtors time to apply for available mortgage modification programs, to com-
plete a trial repayment plan, and to await the decision on a permanent loan
modification.
The fourth finding, and the most encouraging, is that nearly one-half of
the homeowner debtors who filed with the assistance of an attorney and who
filed a plan succeeded in completing their repayment plans and avoided fore-
closure. How these same debtors would have fared outside of bankruptcy is
unknown, but a chapter 13 filing allowed them the opportunity to save their
homes. While chapter 13 may be an expensive remedy, it is an effective one
when debtors employ the powerful tools it offers for curing defaults, strip-
ping off underwater liens, and shedding unsecured debts.
"U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA, MORTGAGE MODIFICATION MEDIATION PRO-
CRAM: JANUARY 1, 2015 TO MARCH 31, 2016, http://www.nvb.uscourts.gov/downloads/mmm/MMM-
summary-report.pdf (reporting a 71% success rate).
891l U.S.C. § 1324(b).
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